In response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant's severe crisis, the Tokyo Electric Power Company planned rolling blackouts, and the Japanese government encouraged companies and residents to conserve electricity by adopting self-restriction plans. We examine the structural changes caused by the disaster in Japan and the effects of the power blackouts and self-restriction plans on the magnitude and pattern of load demand. The results show that the total demand decreased after the disaster and changed from weekdays to weekends and holidays. In addition, the effect of temperature on load demand changed after the disaster.
Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake and the resultant tsunami, which was more than 12 m high, hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on the afternoon of 11 March 2011 (Aoki & Rothwell 2013) . The disaster caused a very serious energy security problem for Japan (Zhang et al. 2012) because it triggered the immediate shutdown of nuclear reactors at the power plants at Fukushima, which were owned by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) (Aoki & Rothwell 2013) . In February 2011, a month before the accident, nuclear power supplied about 31% of Japan's electricity (Hayashi & Hughes 2013) and was considered to be the baseload energy, accounting for approximately 40% of TEPCO's total electricity output. Immediately after the disaster, TEPCO's electricity supply capacity decreased to about 31 million kW, compared with its predisaster capacity of 52 million kW (Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry 2011). After May 2011, the number of TEPCO's operating reactors steadily dwindled to zero. This was a tragic disaster and a turning point in terms of Japan's energy security.
Data and methods
All data quoted are from the TEPCO website (http://www.tepco.co.jp/forecast/html/ download-j.html). The daily load demand data set from 1 January 2008 to 12 March 2012 (1 year after the disaster) is used in the analysis. The aggregated daily load data from 1 January 2008 to 12 March 2012 are presented in Figure 1 . 2 It can be seen from Figure 1 that the load demand declined during 2011 compared with earlier years.
This study examines the design and modeling of the daily load demand in general and in the presence of an energy crisis. Because of the relative ease and superior performance of regression analyses in the load-forecasting literature (Hinman & Hickey 2009 ), this study employs an autoregressive model with exogenous variables. We follow Hyde and Hodnett's (1997) approach in assuming that the electrical load at any particular time is a linear combination of various components. By adding some adjustments to suit the situation under investigation, we assume that the electrical load is a linear combination of five components 3 as follows:
• Typical load shape: given no weather effects or special events.
• The special day effect: either on a weekly basis (weekends) and/or a yearly basis (public holidays). • Weather sensitivity: represented by temperature and/or any other weather factors. 2 TEPCO provides electric power supply at each o'clock measured in 10,000 kW. We consider that its supply level continues for 1 hour; then, for example, we estimate the electric power supply from 0:00 to 1:00 measured in 10,000 kWh, using the reported electric power supply at 0:00 o'clock. We aggregate the estimated electric power supply estimated by the provided electric power supply from 0:00 to 23:00. We consider the aggregated power supply as an approximated daily load demand. The mean of the load demand for our sample is 84,666.27 in 10,000 kWh. 3 In our paper, following Hyde and Hodnett (1997) , we assume that the electrical load is a linear combination of five components; so we estimate an additive type linear model for the electrical load demand. Of course, we can estimate a multiple type model (a log-linear model), but we choose the additive type because the adjusted R 2 is large enough.
• Unusual or special events that lead to a significant deviation from typical load behavior.
This includes the disaster effect and the impact of rolling blackouts and self-restriction plans. • Random load component: the unexplained component of the load. Then, our model is constructed as explained in the following sections.
Typical load shape
In the literature, there is a consensus that the autoregressive model has a superior performance in any given region (Hinman & Hickey 2009 ). In our analysis, given no weather effects or special events, the demand at time (t) is represented by lagged load demand (using an autoregressive model). One-day lagged load demand and 7-day lagged load demand are shown to have a significant impact on demand at time (t). In addition, the 1-day lagged load demand effect is not constant across days. The interactions between the 1-day lagged load demand and Mondays, as well as the dummy variable for days after a holiday, are significant. It is of interest to determine whether the link between the lagged load demand and the load demand at time (t) changed after the disaster.
Effect of special days
The data show a strong weekly effect, with substantially reduced loads on weekends. Previous approaches to short-term forecasting of normal and anomalous loads mostly employ regression-based methods with dummy variables for special days-that is, weekends and public holidays (see Ramanathan et al. 1997; Pardo et al. 2002; Cottet & Smith 2003; Cancelo et al. 2008; Dordonnat et al. 2008; Soares & Medeiros 2008; De Livera et al. 2011) .
In our study, we seek to estimate the impact of the disaster on weekday load demand. Weekly seasonality has been modeled using four dummy variables that have a proven significant impact on demand at time (t): The first represents Mondays (for Mondays,
, whereas the second is a grouped dummy variable for Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays combined ( = TWT 1 t for Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday; otherwise = TWT 0 t ). Friday is considered part of the control group. In 2001, Japan introduced the so-called "happy Monday system," whereby a number of public holidays were moved to Mondays, creating 3-day weekends for those with 5-day working weeks. We find that Saturdays and Sundays show different patterns depending on whether they are followed by a working Monday or a happy Monday. Thus, two additional dummy variables are utilized; one represents weekends followed by a working Monday ( = WE 1 t for a Saturday or Sunday followed by a working Monday; otherwise = WE 0 t ), and the other dummy indicates weekends followed by a happy Monday ( = LWE 1 t for a Saturday or Sunday followed by a happy Monday; otherwise = LWE 0 t ). We refer to weekends followed by a happy Monday as long weekends.
To model annual seasonality, following Arora and Taylor (2013) , we introduced four types of dummy variables for holidays. The main reason for this is to determine the impact of the disaster on several types of holidays separately, especially long holidays. We included three additional dummy variables to represent public holidays: one for the Golden Week ). The rest of this paper uses the term "long holidays" to refer to the New Year holiday and Golden Week, and "short holidays" to refer to other single-day public holidays. In addition, we introduce a dummy variable for the day after a holiday ( = DAYAFTERHOLIDAY 1 t for the day after a holiday and zero otherwise). Cancelo et al. (2008) note that most annual seasonality can be explained by weather variables and dummy variables for vacation periods. There is an agreement in the literature that including exogenous variables such as temperature can potentially improve model performance (Soares & Souza 2006; Taylor et al. 2006 ). In addition, it is important to determine whether the relationship between temperature and load demand changed after the disaster to analyze any change that might have occurred.
Weather sensitivity
We obtained the maximum daily temperature in degrees Celsius. Because temperature has a great effect on load demand, and because it is important to specify the weather component of the model thoroughly, we include the current maximum and lagged temperatures from the previous day and their squared values to allow for a nonlinear quadratic relationship. 4
Unusual or special events
Because of the uncertainty associated with natural disasters, they are usually followed by drastic and irregular fluctuations of demand (Xu et al. 2010) . To understand the effect of the 2011 disaster in Japan more clearly, we first conduct a comprehensive analysis of the situation after the disaster. The major events that took place were as follows:
• In the immediate aftermath, because of the power shortage caused by the shutdown of TEPCO's nuclear reactors, nine prefectures served by TEPCO experienced power rationing. While TEPCO scrambled to find a temporary power solution, rolling blackouts began on 14 March and lasted for 2 weeks. We refer to this as the "rolling blackouts period." • Japan began promoting reduction in total energy usage. In its report on 25 March 2011, The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry announced that it was highly important for companies and the public to adopt an overall energy-sustainable lifestyle and emphasized the need to formulate plans to curb electricity demand. • During the summer months, the government requested large users (those with contracts exceeding 500 kW) to reduce their power consumption by 15% below that of the previous
year. Small users, including households, were given the same target but without enforcement measures. In Japan, household demand is estimated to constitute one-third of all-electric power consumption during peak times (Tanaka & Ida 2013; Kimura & Nishio 2016 ) . Self-restriction plans officially began at the beginning of July 2011 to avoid power outages during summer. In response, many businesses changed their work schedules and shifted vacation days to distribute energy usage evenly across the week (Kajitani 2016) . Others shortened their working hours. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry also suggested extending summer holidays to save electricity. These restrictions were repealed on 9 September 2011. We refer to this as the "self-restriction" period.
Based on this, three dummy variables were added to the model.
. , for the whole period after the disaster-that is, after 11 March 2011, to account for the disaster effect.
• A dummy variable to account for the rolling blackout period from 14 March 2011 to 28
March 2011 ( ) D R B t . , . • A dummy variable for the self-restriction period that was officially announced on 1 July 2011 and repealed on 9 September 2011 (D S R t . , ).
In addition, to check for any possible change in the values of the independent variables after the disaster, all possible interactions between the three postdisaster dummies and all other independent variables were added to the model. An interactive variable (the product of two variables) can change the value of the dependent variable from that obtained when the two variables are considered individually. For example, by allowing an interaction between the postdisaster dummy variable and temperature, we allow the impact of the disaster on load consumption to vary with variations in temperature. All the three dummy variables take the value of zero before the events-the earthquake, the starting of the rolling blackout period, and the starting of the selfrestriction period-and take the value of one after the events. Therefore, the coefficient of these dummy variables represents additional changes in the constant and the coefficients of the interactive variables. Simultaneously, their changes are statistically significant if the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables are statistically significant.
All independent variables with all possible interactive variables were used. Then, we omitted the variables for which insignificant coefficients were estimated and searched for the model. The selected model is estimated as follows: 
Table 1 explains the abbreviations for the dependent and independent variables. Quantifying the change in load demand pattern and magnitude after the 2011 disaster, the main topic of this study is discussed in section 3.
Analysis and results
Equation 1 is estimated using ordinary least squares. We have 1,533 observations to estimate this model. Using the Newey-West (Newey & West, 1994) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, we select the model for which all the estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of determination indicates that roughly 95% of the variation in daily load can be explained by all the independent variables included in the estimation together. Table 2 summarizes the model estimation outputs.
Using the log-likelihood ratio test, we checked the null hypothesis that the sum of the postdisaster dummy variables and the interactive variables' coefficients equals zero. The null hypothesis is rejected with a P value of <0.001. This indicates the presence of structural changes in load demand after the disaster. 5 To analyze the effect of the disaster on load demand, all independent variable coefficients before and after the disaster were compared. To calculate the independent variables' Dummy variable equal to 1 during the self-restriction period and 0 otherwise 5 One referee points out that what we found in this paper is not structural change but a temporal change because it is estimated with the data only one year after the disaster. Of course, this is a limitation of our research and this is a temporal change in some economic sense. However, we use the word "structural change" in this paper as a technical term in the regression analysis context or econometrics. In addition, now TEPCO does not provide long-run data of hourly electric power supply at each o'clock, so we do not take a simple method with dummy variables to detect structural changes in electricity demand. coefficients after the disaster, the coefficients for predisaster independent and interactive variables were summed. For illustration, consider a simpler model:
where y t is the load demand at time (t), x t the independent variables at time (t), D t the postdisaster dummy variables, and D t x t the postdisaster interactive variables. This model is much simpler than model 1, although it is basically of the same form as model 1, which includes some independent variables and dummy variables for representing the structural changes in the postdisaster period. One difference is that model 1 includes some lagged dependent variables. The effect of the lagged dependent variable will be explained in section 3.3. From Equation 2, before the disaster, the impact of x t on y t equals β, in other words, the dependent variable is formed as
because the dummy variable for postdisaster periods takes a value of 0. On the other hand, the dependent variable for the postdisaster period is formed as
because the dummy variable for the postdisaster periods takes a value of 1. Using these formulations, we will estimate the effects through the dummy variables for the postdisaster period and the effects of the rolling blackout and self-restriction period on the dependent variables (load demand). Table 3 summarizes the parameters of the independent variables before and after the disaster as well as during the power blackouts and self-restriction periods. The postdisaster model is generated by setting D P D t . , equal to 1. In addition, the rolling blackout model coefficients are generated by setting D P D t . , and D R B t . , equal to 1, and in the self-restriction model, D P D t . , and D S R t . , are both set equal to 1. All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 5%, and, thus, the changes are statistically significant if the calculated coefficients differ between the predisaster and postdisaster periods.
The effect of the disaster on the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients
The constant term declined by about 30% for 1 year after the disaster, 6 indicating a downward shift in the regression line; in other words, the load demand fell. Arguably, a share of this reduction arose from the lower supply capacity. However, TEPCO had announced that a gradual increase in its supply capacity was taking place, and had almost fully succeeded in recovering its maximum generating capacity by the end of July 2011. This suggests that the supply shock was not the only reason for the fall in demand; the effectiveness of the voluntary energy-saving plans by the Japanese government and the public played a key role.
During the power blackout period, the constant term declined by 88%, indicating a severe decline in load consumption. 7 The effect of the 1-day lagged load demand on load demand at time (t) increased by about 20% after the disaster. The 1-day lagged load contributes 0.77 to the forecast after the disaster (compared with 0.64 beforehand), except on Mondays, when it was 0.86 (0.77 + 0.09), and on days after holidays, when it was 0.81 (0.77 + 0.045). However, during the self-restriction period, the 1-day lagged load contribution to the forecast declined to 0.52. The effect of the 7-day lagged load was reversed after the earthquake, as represented by the − Y t 7 estimated coefficient, which shows that an increase in load demand at time (t -7) by 1 unit reduced demand at time (t) by 0.01 units after the disaster. Demand on Mondays declined during the rolling blackout and self-restriction periods. This is possible because many businesses changed their work schedules from weekdays to weekends during the self-restriction period. This also explains the increase in the weekend coefficient value after the disaster and especially during the self-restriction period. It can be said that self-restrictions during the summer months succeeded in decreasing demand during weekdays and distributing energy usage across the week.
The estimated coefficient for long holidays (i.e., Golden Week and the New Year holiday) also increased after the disaster. It is possible that some factories and companies tended to work during long holidays to distribute the load usage across the year. The estimated coefficients for other short public holidays (no longer than 1 day) as well as those for Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday were constant before and after the disaster. All things considered, while total demand decreased, it shifted from weekdays to weekends and long public holidays.
Particular care must be taken to interpret the effect of temperature correctly. We found that analyzing the shape of the marginal effect of temperature on load demand is a suitable means to show changes in the load consumption pattern after the disaster. To calculate marginal load values, we take the partial derivative of Y t with respect to Tmp t and solve it for different temperature levels (from the minimum to maximum values of Tmp t 8 . 20.13743 -20.13743 -20.13743 -20.13743 Note: The interactive variable for Mondays (MON t ) is only significant during the rolling blackout and selfrestriction periods.
− Y t 1 and − Y t 7 are the 1-day lagged load demand and 7-day lagged load demand, respectively.
In Figure 2 , we plot the marginal load demand values against the maximum temperature levels before and after the disaster. It can be seen that for lower temperature levels, load consumption increased at a higher rate after the disaster; however, for higher temperature levels, load consumption declined at a lower rate after the disaster. In other words, after the disaster, load consumption increased during winter and declined during summer.
Before the disaster, as outside temperature increases by each degree above zero, there is a reduction in the daily load of 2,604.2 units. Taking the partial derivative of Y t with respect to Tmp t , setting the equation equal to 0, and finally solving for Tmp t , we find that above 20.7°C, an increase in temperature begins to increase the daily load. 9 Thus, below 20.7°C, load decreases at a declining rate as temperature increases; above 20.7°C, load increases at a faster rate as temperature increases. After disaster, we find that an increase in temperature begins to increase the daily load faster at 21.4°C (compared with 20.7°C predisaster). 10 This suggests that after the disaster, people became less sensitive to higher temperature levels. Kajitani (2016) suggests that the cooling and heating demand patterns changed after the disaster; our analysis suggests the same.
Effect of load demand patterns with pre-and postdisaster models
In section 3.1, we considered the magnitude of the effects of the disaster. In this section, we analyze another aspect of the effects of the disaster and the policy responses, the rolling blackouts, and self-restrictions. Figure 3 compares the forecast load values for the period from 11 March 2011 to 12 March 2012, generated using the predisaster model (i.e., when D P D t . , equals 0) and the forecast load values generated using the postdisaster model (when D P D t . , equals 1). It can be seen from Figure 3 that the postdisaster forecasts are lower than predisaster forecasts, which means that the disaster caused a decrease in load demand. The area between the two lines represents the disaster effect. The decrease in demand persisted for 1 year after the disaster and continued after the self-restriction plans were repealed. Figure 4 plots the load forecasts generated using the predisaster model and those generated using the rolling blackout model (i.e., when D P D t . , and D R B t . , are equal to 1). Figure 5 plots the forecasts generated using the predisaster model and those generated using the selfrestriction model (i.e., when D P D t . , and D S R t . , are equal to 1). While it is evident from Figure 4 that the power blackouts caused a decline in load demand, Figure 5 does not provide a clear demonstration of the effect of the self-restriction plans. To overcome this problem, we plotted the difference between the forecasted values generated using the models in Figures 6 and 7 . Figure 6 shows the effects of the disaster and rolling blackouts on load demand during the rolling blackout period. The disaster effect is equal to the difference between the pre-and postdisaster forecast values (predisaster forecasts minus postdisaster forecasts), whereas that of the rolling blackouts is the difference between the predisaster forecasts and the forecast load demand values during the rolling blackout period. The area between the two lines represents the effect of the rolling blackouts. Again, it is confirmed that the rolling blackouts caused a decline in load demand. Figure 7 plots the disaster and self-restriction effects. The self-restriction effect is the difference between predisaster forecasts and the forecast load demand values during the selfrestriction period, generated by the self-restrictions model. It is clear that the self-restriction plans shifted demand from weekdays to weekends but did not reduce the magnitude of demand. In Figure 7 , when the line that represents the disaster effect is above the other (predisaster) line, it indicates that the self-restriction plans caused an increase in load demand. Although this is the case for weekends, the opposite is true for weekdays. Bearing in mind that the main aim of the self-restriction plans was to avoid power blackouts during peak times, we can conclude that this policy achieved its goals.
All things considered, a constant decline in load demand occurred after the disaster, as indicated by the decrease in the constant term value. In addition, while rolling blackouts greatly decreased load demand, it seems that the self-restriction plans shifted demand from weekdays to weekends. This can be seen in Table 3 ; the self-restriction plans changed the estimated coefficient of Mondays and long weekends only, decreasing the demand on Mondays and shifting it to long weekends. This assisted in decreasing peak demand during weekdays and eliminated the risk of power blackouts. In addition, the impact of temperature on load demand changed after the disaster.
The effect of the disaster on load demand in the long run
Estimated model 1 is a so-called partial adjustment model in econometrics. The impacts of the independent variable changes are different in the short and long runs. What we refer to as the "short run" is the instantaneous impact of the change in the independent variable, whereas the "long run" here is the ongoing impact of the changes in the independent variable and its accumulated effects on the dependent variable until their effects are extinguished. Our model has two ways of conveying the long-run effects. First, instead of using Equation 2, we simplify Equation 1 to yield the following model:
where γ measures the instantaneous (or short-term) effect of x t on y. A lagged dependent variable ( − y t 1 ) is included in the model; therefore, because x t has an effect on y t , x t will also have an effect on + y t 1 through the lagged dependent variable, and the size of this effect will be βγx : When the instantaneous effect and all the delayed effects into the infinite future are summed, the cumulative effect of x t on β γ γ β β β (( /( − )) = ( + + + +…)) y x 1 1 1 t 2 3 is called the long-term effect.
Because our model (shown in Eq. 1) includes two lagged dependent variables, − Y t 1 and − Y t 7 , the long-term effect of all independent variables other than − Y t 1 and − Y t 7 is equal to β β γ ( /( − − )) x 1 1 t 1 2
, where β 1 and β 2 are the parameters of the independent variables − Y t 1 and − Y t 7 , respectively, and γ is the parameter of the independent variable x. The second route through which the long-run effect operates is conveyed through the lagged independent variables that are included in our model. For simplicity, we consider the following model:
The accumulated long-run effects of x t on y t become δ δ + 1 2 . Applying these two accumulation methods yields the long-run effects of the independent variables on demand at time (t), presented in Table 4 .
In Table 4 , we neglect the effect of × − DAYAFTERHOLIDAY Y t t 1 and × − MON Y t t 1 because the dummy variables for specific days of the week affect demand only on a specific day and the calculation of the magnitude is complicated. In the long run after the disaster, the load demand continued to decline, as shown by the 8% decline in the value of the constant. The estimated coefficient for the Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday load increased after the disaster. In addition, the estimated coefficients for the long holidays-New Year and Golden Week-and those for the long weekends increased after the disaster. By contrast, short public holidays and weekends followed by working Mondays showed a decline in load demand after the disaster.
The effect of temperature can be shown by the change in the shape of the marginal effect. Figure 8 shows that, in the long run, for both high and low temperatures, demand increased at a reduced rate after the disaster. At the same temperature, the load consumption was lower after the disaster.
Conclusion
From the policy maker's point of view, one of the most important lessons from this severe disaster and the policy responses that followed is the fact that no blackouts occurred due to a shortage of electricity at the time when the electricity supply was recovering. Of course, a blackout did occur as a result of the earthquake itself for a relatively wide region. However, once the recovering period started and the government implemented its policies of rolling blackouts and self-restrictions, only the planned blackouts and no others occurred. Our analysis indicates how the electricity demands of the local residents were reduced. One means was a decline in demand, as indicated by the downward shift in the regression line after the disaster. To avoid blackouts, companies and residents reduced their overall load consumption. Another means was a shift in the load demand from working days to weekends and public holidays. In addition, the temperature at which load demand began to increase declined after the disaster. These findings are important for policymakers learning how to cope with an energy crisis. In other words, policymakers would get an idea of self-restriction in a similar manner to avoid the blackout caused by the shortage of the electric power supply in the next crisis. Of course, in addition to the changes in electricity demand, we should accumulate the studies on the effects on or damages to society caused by the self-restriction or rolling blackouts plan.
The decline and shifts in demand persisted for 1 year after the disaster and continued despite the increase in supply capacity and the repeal of the summer self-restriction plans. The changes in load demand magnitudes and patterns also suggest that the sudden energy crisis assisted in encouraging people to adopt voluntary electricity-saving plans. However, this raises the question of whether the Japanese people developed new energy consumption habits after the disaster, and, if so, how long these habits will last. Further research is needed to assess these issues. In addition, these findings raise questions regarding the effectiveness of voluntary energy saving in ordinary nondisaster situations.
In the present paper, we have focused on changes in load demand before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake. In future research, we aim to extend the scope of our study further to examine the effects of the disaster on people's local economic activities and the local economy, as other researchers have done in relation to other disasters, including hurricanes (e.g., West and Lenze 1994) and earthquakes (e.g., Rose et al. 1997; Haung and Hosoe 2016) . In addition, after the energy crisis, many customers, especially large customers, changed their contracts from TEPCO to other companies. It would be interesting to investigate the structural changes using sectoral data. Furthermore, some structural changes might occur in other electric power companies' load demand as a result of the shift of contracts away from TEPCO. However, as we cannot obtain data on the electricity demand by industry, commercial, and household sectors, this research issue remains a problem to be solved. 11
